

Statement of
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Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 20, 1985

Thank you for the privilege of presenting our views on this critical issue in arms control policy -- Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties, commitments, and obligations. Director Adelman has given you a rundown of the concerns we have, which have been covered separately in our Report to Congress, both the classified and unclassified version. As you know, the record is troubling. Let me elaborate on what it means for US foreign and strategic arms control policy, and what we intend to do to address these problems.

In foreign policy terms, the meaning of this record is clear. Soviet noncompliance with its obligations and commitments corrodes the US-Soviet relationship, calling into question our ability to deal with the Soviet government from a common standard of reliability and integrity. These standards are essential elements of any constructive dialogue between two countries; in the case of the US-Soviet relationship, where the ideological

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divide is so great and the stakes for world peace so high, they are doubly important. Soviet unwillingness to address our concerns in a serious manner, to alleviate our apprehensions and take corrective actions or explain their activities in ways that foster a better foundation for a productive relationship, is particularly troubling. It suggests that they take less seriously than they must these standards of reliability and integrity which we all should, after all, be able to take for granted. Their willingness to work with us to satisfactorily resolve our concerns would have a very positive influence on US-Soviet relations.

In the arms control area, these activities call into question important security benefits from arms control, create new security risks, and undermine the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. For example:

-- The aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Such activities would have grave repercussions on the strategic balance, and on our ability to maintain our deterrent.

-- Soviet encryption of missile test telemetry, which impedes verification in violation of Soviet commitments to the contrary, calls into question our future ability to constrain the qualitative aspects of their forces which hold the greatest potential for instability.

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In short, the activities over which we have concerns are in and of themselves detrimental to the arms control process. That said, what is to be done about this problem? Our objective is to ensure that both the letter and intent of treaty obligations and commitments will be fulfilled. To this end, we are:

- Analyzing further issues of possible noncompliance.
- Reporting on such issues to the Congress.
- Seeking from the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels explanations, clarifications, and where necessary, corrective actions.
- Taking the security implications of these violations into account in our defense modernization planning.

Let me elaborate briefly here. As you know, we have addressed many of our concerns with the Soviets privately, in the confidential channel of the Standing Consultative Commission and in other bilateral channels. Those channels remain an important part of our compliance policy. Indeed, it is our policy not to report publicly on Soviet violations until we have had dialogue with them in these channels.

Clearly, however, dialogue alone is not enough. In looking at past and current instances of noncompliance, we have to address the military significance of these actions and take

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steps accordingly. For example, the various activities engaged in by the Soviet Union which erode the ABM Treaty regime, and which suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its territory, requires us to take a better look at our preparation for dealing with such a defense, including advanced penetration aids or other means to counter such Soviet defense measures may be one way of dealing with this problem.

Looking toward the future, the solution must be to draft treaty language which is clear in its obligations to both sides. Our negotiators in Geneva have been directed to take these compliance findings into account as they prepare for these negotiations, and draft positions accordingly.

They will also raise our concerns about past and current Soviet activities, in an effort to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty, and to seek a satisfactory outcome to our other concerns as well.

It will, for example, be difficult to move ahead in the defense and space forum without a satisfactory resolution of the Krasnoyarsk issue. But we are hopeful that progress in the arms control process will encourage the Soviets and give them incentives to resolve these compliance concerns.

Let me end by stressing that arms control agreements, properly pursued, can enhance stability and deterrence. Our preparations for Geneva are intensively exploring proposals

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which would do just this. At the same time, the long-term viability of the arms control process requires that compliance comes once again to be something that is expected and adhered to as a matter of course. Soviet efforts which alleviate our concerns in this area will have a pronounced positive effect on our overall arms control dialogue.

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